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In little more than one decade, global gambling revenue (the amount
staked minus winning payouts) has more than doubled, from just over
US$200 billion to US$450 billion (GBGC 2015). The origins of this remark-
able expansion can be traced to the United States, where, during the
1970s, state governments were attracted to the potential tax revenue of
regulated gambling. Previously, there had been no legal casinos in the
United States outside Nevada. Today gambling is available in all states
apart from Hawaii and Utah, and eighteen states have commercial land-
based or riverboat casinos. In addition, so-called ‘tribal’ or ‘Indian’ ‘gam-
ing’, protected since 1988, has grown into a US$28 billion industry (NIGC
2014). American corporations favour the softer term gaming over gambling
and have worked hard to encourage legislators to use this term despite
the confusion it causes. Between 1974 and 1994 the amount of money
Americans legally wagered rose a staggering 2,800 percent, from US$17
billion to US$482 billion (Frontline 1996).
As the market for casino gambling in the United States approached
saturation in the early 2000s, operators shifted their focus to Asia, which
overtook North America as the largest regional market in 2010 (GBGC
2013). In Macau, home to the only legal casino gambling in China, gross
revenue grew from less than US$1 billion in 2003 to US$46 billion by
2013. Despite a recent slowdown in growth, the regulated market in Ma-
cau is approximately seven times the size of Las Vegas (Riley 2014).
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The impact of gambling expansion on global health is largely un-
known. Gamblers are a difficult-to-reach population, reticent about being
identified, and often guarded about their activities. As a result, research
often focuses on small numbers of self-selected subjects (treatment-seek-
ing ‘problem’ gamblers) and rarely includes a longitudinal dimension
(Scholes-Balog et al. 2015). Despite these difficulties, studies in diverse
settings including Australia (Billi et al. 2014), the United States (Petry et
al. 2005) and South Korea (Park et al. 2010) suggest that people experienc-
ing problems with gambling can suffer from a range of health issues
including increased rates of mental illness (Dowling et al. 2015), alcohol
and drug dependency (Petry et al. 2005) and elevated suicide rates (Petry
and Kiluck 2002).
Estimates of the social costs of gambling vary widely (Wynne and
Shaffer 2003, 120). In 1999, the Australian Productivity Commission sug-
gested that the annual economic impact of a person experiencing a severe
problem with gambling ranged from AUS$6,000 to AUS$19,000 (1999,
9.10) while in the United States estimates vary from US$9,000 (Thompson
et al. 1997) to US$50,000 (Kindt 1995). It is also widely accepted that the
impact of problem gambling is not limited to individuals and that on
average, five to ten family members and friends are affected by each
person with gambling problems (Australian Productivity Commission
1999, 23).
Gambling in Europe and North America was generally prohibited on
moral grounds prior to the emergence of neoliberal ideologies in the
1980s that rejected state intervention. Gambling was reframed as a leisure
activity and an issue of consumer freedom. A key element of this normal-
isation process has been the creation of an abnormal category of behavi-
our called ‘problem gambling’ that effectively frees ‘normal’ gambling of
negative associations and provides corporations with a socially accept-
able product to promote.
Based on data gathered from members of the gambling industries in
Europe, North America and Asia, this chapter describes how corpora-
tions seek to shape our understanding of gambling. It focuses on the
maintenance of two important tropes that underpin the current framing
of commercial gambling, ‘responsible gambling’ and ‘problem gambling’,
and the support by industry for research maintaining these ideas.
BACKGROUND
In 1996 the U.S. government created the National Gambling Impact Com-
mission, with a budget of US$5 million, to assess the effects of the rapid
growth in gambling in the country. The same year, the American Gaming
Association, the trade organisation representing the land-based casino
industry, founded by former chairman of the Republican Party Frank
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Fahrenkopf, created the National Centre for Responsible Gambling
(NCRG). The role of the NCRG was to fund research to ‘identify the risk
factors for gambling disorders and determine methods for not only treat-
ing the disorder but preventing it, much like physicians can identify pa-
tients at risk from cardiovascular disease long before a heart attack’
(NCRG website 2009, quoted in Schüll 2012, 261).
Anthropologist Natasha Schüll, who spent more than fifteen years
conducting fieldwork in Las Vegas argues that
by the mid-1990s, the gambling industry had already grasped (like the
alcohol industry had some decades earlier) that a medical diagnosis
linked to the excessive consumption of its product could serve to de-
flect attention away from the product’s potentially problematic role in
promoting that consumption, and onto the biological and psychologi-
cal vulnerabilities of a small minority of its customers. (2012, 261)
The field of gambling studies developed alongside the commercial
industry and is by psychologists who identify, quantify and evaluate the
treatment of individuals who have been harmed by gambling and, to a
lesser extent, the impact of these experiences on their families and
friends. Gambling that damages the health and well-being of individuals
and their families is described as ‘problem gambling’ or ‘pathological
gambling’, a more severe, clinically identifiable condition (Petry 2006).
These approaches typically locate causal factors within individual beha-
viour, or physiological or psychological makeup, while largely overlook-
ing structural factors such as the industry’s role in society, social influ-
ences on individual choices, and the adequacy of regulation. Such fram-
ing is conducive to industry expansion, and lends legitimacy to gambling
taxes as a source of government revenue (Hancock 2011; Kingma 2008).
METHODS
The concept of ‘problem gambling’ emerged during the 1980s, replacing
the pejorative term degenerate gambler. It provides a medicalised frame-
work for research (Reith 2007) that currently dominates gambling stud-
ies, which is traditionally housed within the discipline of psychology.
Anthropologists, on the other hand, have investigated the diverse eco-
nomic functions and symbolic meanings of gambling as a form of ex-
change. In the 1970s, Geertz described betting on cock fights in Bali as a
competition for status between men in an extremely hierarchical society
(Geertz 2005). In contrast, the hunting and gathering Hadza of Tanzania
used gambling to reduce inequality, staking meat in order to create a
distribution based on chance rather than differences in hunting ability in
the 1960s (Woodburn 1982). Riches (1975) also found a moral obligation
to gamble among Inuit communities in the 1970s whereby games helped
to randomly distribute scarce commodities. Studies of commercial gam-
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bling in California (Hayano 1982) and Las Vegas (Schüll 2012) have simi-
larly focused on the broader impacts of gambling as a means of distribut-
ing wealth and status.
Participant observation is fundamental to anthropological research
into social processes. Bronislaw Malinowski (1922), credited with invent-
ing participant observation in the 1920s, claimed that spending long peri-
ods of time with subjects enables anthropologists to compare what peo-
ple say they do with what they actually do. This approach is particularly
helpful in relation to gambling and other stigmatised activities. If anthro-
pologists spend sufficient time in betting shops, casinos or bingo halls,
people may begin to behave as they would before the anthropologist
arrived. At the same time, anthropological fieldwork must be overt and
all participants must provide informed consent. In practice this means
that the knowledge created through participant observation is reflexive
and dialogic, that is, it emerges from the relationships between the
anthropologist and research participants.
This chapter is based on fieldwork with the people who produce and
shape gambling. The majority of current research focuses on the con-
sumption of gambling, and comparatively little is written about produc-
tion issues such as the structure of the industry, what motivates employ-
ees, and how they view their work. The gambling industry is, in its own
words, ‘secretive, litigious and extremely well-funded’ (North American
casino executive 2012), and gaining access is very difficult. During the
last nine years I have spent extended periods of time with gamblers in
betting shops, casinos and bingo halls. I trained and worked as a cashier
in betting shops and in social gaming studios in London, and at a mobile
casino operator in Gibraltar.
These conventional ethnographic encounters were augmented by
more disparate experiences at conferences, where key industry actors
gather to express a collective identity. Between 2010 and 2015 I attended
thirty industry conferences in London, Tokyo, Barcelona, Berlin, Dublin,
Macau and Greece and listened to over a hundred presentations. Related
research has included semi-structured interviews with 132 individuals,
including traditional gambling operators, twenty newcomers to the gam-
bling industry who had backgrounds in the media, console gaming, fi-
nancial services and marketing gaming lawyers, investors, politicians,
regulators, journalists, researchers and treatment providers.
The gambling industry is heterogeneous: many people are interested
in speaking openly with someone from outside their usual circle; others
are guarded and view conversations with independent researchers as
either a waste of time or a potential threat to commercial secrecy or
reputation. I have anonymised the following quotes, providing only basic
information that should not allow insiders to identify one another.
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FINDINGS
In May 2014, Alan Feldman, chairman of the NCRG and senior vice presi-
dent of public affairs for MGM Resorts International, addressed a confer-
ence in Japan, where casino gambling is currently banned. Earlier in the
year, Japanese president Shinzo Abe had indicated that ‘integrated re-
sorts’, featuring casinos similar to those found in Las Vegas and Singa-
pore, would be legalised ahead of the 2020 Olympics as part of plans to
kick start the economy. Media predicted that casinos could generate as
much as US$40 billion annually, and become potentially the second-
biggest market after Macau (Yamaguchi 2014). Asked to distinguish be-
tween problem gaming and responsible gaming, Feldman told the audi-
ence of Japanese legislators that ‘we need to acknowledge the fact that
there are people who are addicted to gambling, but their addiction is a
brain issue, a brain disorder that is going to exist whether or not there is
legalised gambling in the environment’.1 He described responsible gam-
bling as the universal solution to problems that may be associated with,
but not ‘caused’ by, legal gambling, arguing that ‘the notion of respon-
sible gaming is very real, it’s very identifiable, it’s very consistent country
to country in various parts of the world and it is something that is readily
applicable here in Japan’. This distinction has been pivotal to industry
expansion, emphasizing self-control of individual behaviour, and direct-
ing the discourse to a focus on treatment and education rather than limit-
ing the supply or promotion of gambling.
Corporate actors present problems with gambling as an individual
frailty that affects a minority of people. In 2011, for example, Neil Goul-
den, then chairman emeritus of the UK gambling corporation Gala Coral
Group, and chairman of the GREaT Foundation (established to raise
money from the industry to pay for research, education and treatment of
gambling problems) told a UK House of Commons select committee that
the problem gambler is obsessive, has a psychological problem and
will bet on all forms of gambling. You are, therefore, dealing with the
nature of the individual. They will often have drug problems, they will
often have alcohol problems, they are predominantly smokers, and the
person has a problem, because gambling in itself is not intrinsically
addictive. (United Kingdom 2011)
Speaking more recently as chairman of the Association of British
Bookmakers (ABB) and chair of the Responsible Gambling Trust (RGT),
an industry-funded charity that ‘funds education, prevention and treat-
ment services and commissions research to broaden public understand-
ing of gambling related harm’ (Responsible Gambling Trust 2015), Goul-
den stated that there was ‘very clear evidence that problem gambling is
about the individual and not any specific gambling product or products’
(ABB 2013a). In the United States, the executive director of the NCRG
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told a Salon journalist that ‘things are not addictive, they’re just not. Ad-
diction is a relationship between the object and a vulnerable person, and
if you don’t have that vulnerability, the odds are you won’t get addicted.
I play a slot machine for 10 minutes and I’m so bored I want to shoot
myself’ (quoted in Strickland 2008).
The corollary of problem gambling is ‘responsible gambling’, a con-
cept based on the twin principles of informed choice and consumer free-
dom that emphasises education, minimal interventions and self-manage-
ment and deemphasises restrictions on the supply of gambling that
might impact on the rights of the ‘normal’ majority to consume freely.
Striking parallels exist with positions adopted by the alcohol and tobacco
industries. The recently created Senet Group (2015), which promotes re-
sponsible gambling in the UK, for instance, was modelled on the Portman
Group, which promotes responsible drinking, and both industries sup-
port voluntary codes of practice, emphasise harm ‘minimisation’ (or ‘re-
duction’)—a concept initially used to counter punitive approaches to il-
licit drug use (McCambridge et al. 2014)—and establish charitable bodies
in anticipation of regulatory changes. The RGT, for example, was estab-
lished in the UK before the Gambling Act of 2005, while the Senet Group
emerged before the release of the RGT’s machine research in December
20142 and the general election in May 2015.
Similarity of approach is underpinned by the movement of key per-
sonnel across the alcohol, tobacco and gambling industries. Dirk Vennix,
CEO of the ABB between 2011 and 2014 and former director of communi-
cations at the Tobacco Manufacturers Association between 2008 and 2011,
recently noted that ‘the two industries share many of the same contacts
within government, and both have the same challenge—“facing a deluge
of regulatory and taxation measures”’ (Welbirg 2012, 18). In October 2014
Chris Searle, former chairman of the Portman Group, addressed an on-
line gambling industry conference in Berlin, observing that
frankly what has happened looks like a copy and paste job from the
drinks industry. I think the gambling industry is 10 to 15 years behind
the evolution of the drinks industry when it comes to social respon-
sibility aspects. . . . What are the positive benefits of betting and gam-
bling for society? They are not clearly merchandised and visible to the
outsider. (quoted in Totally Gaming 2014)
Despite the fierce competition and deep distrust that exists between
rival sectors, the UK gambling industry presents a relatively united front
in its endorsement of responsible gambling. In 2013 the Association of
British Bookmakers announced that ‘we intend to create a step change in
responsible gambling thinking based around informed choice by adult
consumers’ (ABB 2013b). For its part, the British Amusement Catering
Trade Association (the UK trade association for amusement arcades and
casinos) has noted that ‘Social Responsibility is about caring for those few
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individuals who have a gambling addiction and need help’[AQ: Please
add citation for this quote]. In 2014 the Industry Group For Responsible
Gambling, which comprises the ABB, BACTA, Bingo Association, Na-
tional Casino Forum and Remote Gambling Association, came together
to endorse this shared conception of ‘responsible gambling’ (Gaming
Business 2014).
The industry has also been united in emphasising individual freedom.
The online company Unibet, which describes itself as a ‘leader in the
European Moneytainment ® industry’, describes responsibility as ‘part of
their corporate DNA’ and defends the freedom of the ‘normal’ majority
to gamble on its website, as well as the commercial right to operate across
borders:
For the vast majority of people, gambling—online and offline—is a fun
and entertaining hobby or social activity. The questions to answer are:
what do 98 per cent of gamblers get out of their gaming? What do they
do right, that the minority does wrong? What good does it do them?
What are the moral benefits for society as a whole? . . . When consumer
protection at large is based upon an informed choice and self-respon-
sibility, why should European consumers be denied and restricted in
their choice to purchase services across borders? (Unibet 2015)
As one senior executive in the UK bookmaking industry argued:
Education, fine. Whatever. We know it doesn’t affect the bottom line.
Messaging, fine, same thing. As long as it doesn’t interfere too much
with the punter you want to keep going . . . fine. Fewer machines?
Lower stakes? Not fine. This is when you get serious. This is risky.
Reducing the number of machines is a serious threat to my business.
Step one: paint the opposition as ‘Nanny staters’. Most of them are
miserable, joyless little shits anyway, so that’s easy. Step 2. Present
yourself as a freedom loving, wealth creating hero. Easily done. (Male
bookmaker, early forties, London, 2013)
Similarly, Steve Donoghue, industry consultant, secretariat of the Parlia-
mentary All Party Betting & Gaming Group and former special advisor to
the Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee Inquiry into the Gambling
Act of 2005 said in 2013 that ‘there’s a party going on that the killjoys
don’t understand’ (quoted by Bennett 2013). Such attitudes extend be-
yond the industry. In 2004 then UK culture secretary Tessa Jowell re-
sponded to criticism of the Gambling Act by saying that ‘there’s a whiff
of snobbery in some of the opposition to new casinos. . . . They are
entitled to those views, but they are not entitled to force them on others’
(quoted in Kite 2004). Similar portrayals of interventions as threats to
freedom, the oppression of the ‘normal’ majority, or evidence of class
prejudice arguments are made in the United States (Caesars 2014) and
Australia (Brewster 2012).
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While these views are normative, industry newcomers with back-
grounds in mobile and online communications or financial services are
sometimes more reflexive. An executive at a leading UK online operator
mused that
gambling operators talk about ‘responsible gambling’—how much did
they have to pay to get that phrase into the gambling jargon? ‘Promot-
ing responsible gambling’. Anyone who has read anything about mes-
saging can see what a brilliant sleight of hand that was for the gam-
bling industry. Well, just try out these two different approaches: Pre-
venting problem gambling. Promoting responsible gambling. Which
would you rather have? What about cigs? ‘Preventing chain smoking’
or ‘Promoting moderate smoking’: which would you sign up for?
Another executive involved in mobile gambling in the UK explained that
when we came into his business we were absolutely flabbergasted that
there was a built-in cushion for bad products. Problem gambling!
When gambling goes wrong! (laughs) You know, you get this big let
off. It says, ‘Don’t worry if people get addicted to your machine or your
game—there are some real weirdos out there. What can you do? People
are weak’. At a very basic level, it shifts responsibility from the indus-
try to the consumer, and that is great for us, but not so great for you.
The efficacy of responsible gambling measures, often enshrined in
codes of practice, has proven difficult to assess for want of baseline data
and shared methodologies (Livingstone et al. 2014). However, a study of
Australian clubs showed that
responsible gambling practices have had little effect on the way the
vast majority of respondents think about their gambling, feel about
their gambling, how often they gamble, how long they gamble for and
how much they spend. . . . Responsible gambling practices cannot be
considered as being very effective for most problem gamblers or for
most of those who are at risk. (Hing 2004, 42)
Corporate Influence of Gambling Research
There is profound disagreement within gambling studies about how
relationships between corporations and researchers should be managed
(Cassidy, Loussaourn and Pisac, 2014; Livingstone and Adams 2015). The
RGT and NCRG favour a partnership model, and several senior research-
ers accept industry research funding. In 2014 Alex Blaszczynski, editor of
the journal International Gambling Studies (IGS), received AUS$1.2 million
from the New South Wales clubs industry, which hosts the majority of
Australia’s controversial ‘pokie’ machines (Livingstone and Woolley
2007; Nicholls 2014). On the IGS website Blaszczynski states that
I do not hold any ongoing position, receive ongoing or significant
funding, and am not engaged in any business or organisation that
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creates a conflict of interest (real, perceived, actual or potential) in the
work I would conduct as Editor of International Gambling Studies.
(International Gambling Studies 2015)
He acknowledges, however, ‘financial professional dealings with the
gambling industry and various State and Federal governments’ that have
include research grants from gambling corporations, governments, and
research bodies within Australia, the United States and Canada, and
compensation and reimbursement for expenses for providing expertise
and reports to governments and industry corporations (International
Gambling Studies 2015). Notwithstanding publisher guidelines (Interna-
tional Society of Addiction Journal Editors 2015), the grants, compensa-
tion and reimbursement are not quantified nor are their sources dis-
closed.
Mark Griffiths, arguably the leading UK figure in gambling studies,
lists numerous grants and paid consultancies from gambling operators
on four continents (Nottingham Trent 2015). Griffiths, with co-author
Michael Auer (2015), recently defended the right of academics to work as
consultants, arguing that ‘research and consultancy are two very separate
activities’ with different aims and ‘the real issue is whether doing consul-
tancy with the gambling industry in any way impacts on independently
funded and subsequently published gambling research’. Their position is
that ‘the gambling industry can benefit from our expertise and that there
is nothing morally wrong in what we do. To us, this is totally separate
from research activity’. Yet Auer has also described how he and Griffiths
‘did one analysis with the data from Austrian Lotteries, who are the only
internet gaming operator in Austria. In return for using our software, we
used their data to publish scientific papers’ (Auer 2013).
Interviews with researchers and members of the industry revealed
varied and subtle forms of influence. As one veteran researcher working
in the UK explained:
The industry are very good, they can offer a very nice little perk. I was
the recipient of quite a lot of corporate hospitality, very nice, thank you
very much! They can do that so they are very good at getting people on
their side by legitimate acceptable ways in this country or not. I mean I
don’t know if they cross the line, they probably do at times, like every-
body else does.
Other researchers described more direct approaches. One academic, who
had worked in both Australia and the UK, recalled how ‘a professional
organisation wanted to find out that the rate of problem gambling was
less than 1% or something like that. My boss was offered a £10,000 bribe
paid straight into his bank account. This bloke turned up in his Jaguar
looking a bit like Arthur Daley off Minder’.
Relatedly, fears of legal action and intimidation can have a chilling
effect on researchers and several had left the field as a result:
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With the anxiety that I always felt about potentially upsetting the in-
dustry and colleagues who were closely linked with them, I had
enough. I didn’t even finish writing up, because it was going to be too
much. So no one ever told me not to publish, but in a sense I self-
sabotaged. I was really scared about potentially annoying the industry
and then getting my reputation trashed, because I saw that happen at
[an event] and it really was horrible. So I had a choice, say everything is
fine. In other words, lie. Or keep quiet and not expose myself to that
critical attention. Wasn’t very brave of me was it?
Another UK researcher described the actions of corporate lawyers
who attended the launch of a new report:
We ran some seminars and workshops to disseminate our findings and
people came to those and attacked us—people from the industry pri-
marily. . . . They tried to intimidate us indirectly in terms of what we
published. And to discredit us in the eyes of other people. No one tried
to shape directly what we wrote, but I didn’t try to take the work
forward after that.
This supports the opinion of an Australian researcher with more than
twenty years’ experience in the field who explained that ‘most research is
managed by never asking questions which are likely to produce embar-
rassing results’. A gambling executive explained this strategy in more
detail:
People in the industry are just suspicious about research because, let’s
face it, the likelihood is that they already know if there’s a problem and
their job is to keep it quiet. If research comes up that we don’t like then
you either say it’s not comparable, because it comes from somewhere
else, or the offering is different, or regulation is different or whatever,
or you look at the methodology and you say well it’s only based on 50
people so it’s hardly representative, or you just get hold of some other
research you’ve done already that says the opposite. It’s not difficult.
Another UK-based industry veteran explained that he would just ignore
bad news, before expressing his unhappiness to the charitable organisa-
tions responsible:
We just don’t respond. Don’t provide any oxygen, but behind the
scenes we might give someone a bollocking for funding a bit of re-
search. If we sit on a board we might show that we weren’t very happy.
When GamCare comes round cap in hand we might point out that we
weren’t very happy. Just the usual things that you would expect really.
CONCLUSION
Gambling studies is an emerging field and has yet to engage with the
epistemological and ethical arguments that have taken place in alcohol or
tobacco research and anthropological research into how ideas about gam-
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bling problems are reproduced helps to explain the general absence of
reliable evidence in the area (Disley et al. 2011). Specifically, current ap-
proaches to analysis serve the interests of a powerful industry seeking to
expand globally, and of governments keen to reap potential benefits in
terms of employment or tax revenue. The common interest of the gam-
bling industry and gambling studies researchers in perpetuating the idea
of problem gambling as an individual shortcoming is a key element of
how this discourse is framed, as is the willingness of researchers to accept
industry funding (Orford 2012).
The impact on the research agenda, the range of methods used by
researchers and the human geography of the field are profound. The
research agenda remains focused on measuring and treating ‘problem
gamblers’, and minimizing or reducing harm through education and self-
management. The range of methods employed is narrow and mono-disci-
plinary, and the definition of accepted evidence is restricted to that which
can be measured or counted, which is constrained by access issues
(Young 2013). The result upon this fiercely politicised field is that broad
questions about corporate influence and global health are marginalised.
As commercial gambling expands into new markets globally, it is critical
that effective ways to assess and counter its impacts on public health are
devised. The intention of this chapter is to bring gambling studies into a
wider conversation where it can benefit from insights developed in simi-
lar fields, and acknowledge the limitations of its rather singular approach
to knowledge creation to date.
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NOTES
1. Speeches recorded while attending the conference in Tokyo.
2. For the full texts of the long-awaited machines research, see:
www.responsiblegamblingtrust.org.uk/Research-Publications.
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